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Body Doubles, Babel’s Voices: 
Katie Mitchell’s Iphigenia at Aulis and the Theatre of Sacrifice 
 
 
[T]he symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing.1 
 
 
1. Body doubles 
  
 16 July 2004: I’m a sweaty bundle of jitters in the back of the National Theatre’s 
Lyttleton auditorium, shifting from side to side in my seat. On stage, Hattie Morahan and 
Kate Duchêne, playing Iphigenia and Clytemnestra in Katie Mitchell’s production of 
Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis, collapse into one another, a messy tangle of clutching 
limbs. Iphigenia has just pleaded with her father Agamemnon (Ben Daniels) for her life, 
but to no avail. She knows now that she must be murdered so that his fleet may make fast 
for Troy, setting in motion a chain of events that will lead to the staging of one of ancient 
Greece’s foundation myths of democratic civilization. And yet for Mitchell this is not a 
moment of grandiose gesture or carefully coded sorrow: Morahan and Duchêne are 
overwhelmed by their emotions in a manner that is rarely seen in British (or North 
American) stage realism. They seem unable to get up; the women who form the chorus 
help them struggle into chairs. Morahan says that they must sing ‘a last song, we must 
sing it together’:2 they duly force a cheerful, journeying tune, through convulsive tears 
                                                 
1 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis’ (1956), in Anthony 
Wilden (trans.), The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 1-87 (p. 84). 
2 I saw Iphigenia at Aulis twice: once live, at the Lyttleton Theatre, in mid-July 2004, and 
again on archive video at the Royal National Theatre archives in London on 18 July 
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and loud gasps that punctuate the song, awkwardly, with upset that seems somehow too 
real, too much, for a play. They grab at each other’s faces, desperate for last touches of 
comfort. Then, lights down: Achilles (Justin Salinger) enters, tells the assembled group 
that Odysseus has decreed Iphigenia must die. The only low, low light on stage filters 
through the huge windows that mark the upper edges of the Lyttleton proscenium, 
radically foreshortened for this production. Iphigenia’s body, clad in her white wedding 
dress, stands out starkly, remarkably bright against the moment’s gloom. The only other 
object that catches my eye is the mannequin at centre stage who wears Iphigenia’s white 
veil, the other portion of her dress’s couture; together, girl and mannequin provoke a 
double-take, sear onto the darkened stage the uncanny image of a future lost in the ruse 
that has brought Iphigenia to Aulis not for marriage, but for murder. For a tense moment, 
we see Iphigenia, literally, as two bodies: the ethereal, other-worldly, virgin-white 
mannequin body dressed for giddy anticipation, and the all-too-worldly body, in its 
                                                                                                                                                 
2006. The video I watched was recorded on 1 July 2004. Mitchell used Don Taylor’s 
1990 translation of the play (reprinted by Methuen in 2004 as the production text), but 
her cast also made a number of additions and improvisations in performance (see Maria 
Shevtsova’s interview with Katie Mitchell, New Theatre Quarterly, 22:1 [2006], 3-18 [p. 
14]). While I do not want to diminish the value of Taylor’s excellent translation or its 
obvious importance to this production’s overall effects, because Mitchell and her actors 
work with text in an interrogatory way (see my arguments below), frequently toying with 
or even discarding the language of the play as written, I have chosen to take all 
quotations from the performance I watched on archive video, cross-referenced with the 
2004 Methuen text only when the audio was unclear. 
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shadow, of a young girl viscerally and psychically overwhelmed by panic, grief, the 
terror of what is to come. Iphigenia becomes a snapshot negative: her pain and fear are 
tangibly, forcefully unmarked3 against the white of her duty to father and country. For 
that tense moment we see her two bodies collide, feel them chafe hard against one 
another. 
 The moment that follows brings thunderous change. The women barricade 
themselves in the dilapidated building where they are lodged, their voices rising against 
the vast din of the army’s machinery outside, in the wings. The lights come down, and 
then, immediately, back up – cold, white, antiseptic, institutional. Iphigenia, shouting, 
fighting with Clytemnestra, surprises everyone as she suddenly embraces her fate: ‘I must 
die, and do it with dignity’. An old, 1940s-style standing microphone is brought on stage; 
with it, she will now orchestrate a command performance of her own sacrifice, piped over 
the P. A. system toward the crowd of citizens waiting just offstage. Those of us in the 
Lyttleton house, however, form another kind of crowd, another kind of audience to 
Iphigenia’s sacrificial staging: we may count ourselves privy to her backstage 
preparations. We will not hear her perfect, unflinching self-abnegation, and we will not 
see her miraculous transformation into a deer on the sacrificial altar – the transformation 
that will supposedly confirm Iphigenia was correct to submit, was rewarded for the 
willing gift of her body to slaughter, was not (in fact) slaughtered at all. Instead, we will 
see the making of this ‘miracle’, the tricks of the theatre that allow a young girl’s violent 
destruction to be passed off as a glorious gift to military adventure, made into myth as 
                                                 
3 See Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
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anything but murder. More than that: we will see the incredible, visceral struggle of the 
body beneath the show and collide with the difficult question of how to encounter it, how 
to move beyond our comfortable empathy to a more rigorous ethics of spectatorship. 
 What happens to a body when circumstance demands it enact its own forgetting? 
How does it react, and what does it abreact? This is the story of the vulnerable, violated 
female body forgotten, effaced, elided – by the machinations of performance. This is the 
story of sacrifice’s careful staging – and of the sacrificial body’s unexpected, 
performative return. 
*** 
 Perhaps I risk stating the obvious when I say that theatre is a remarkably 
ambivalent medium. While many performance scholars (and I gladly include myself in 
these ranks) cleave whole-heartedly to theatre’s power to represent injustice and provoke 
social activism, students of Michel Foucault and after also know well performance’s 
potential to act on behalf of state power, as national governments stage-manage the 
appearance of their authority on a grand scale. From early English royal entry pageants to 
the executionary theatres of the French Revolution; from Argentina during the Dirty War 
to contemporary North Korea to George W. Bush proudly costumed as Commander-in-
Chief on the deck of an air-craft carrier in the Persian Gulf, state performances routinely 
mask the loss of human life with the pompous spectacle of national good, neatly effacing 
massive suffering by eliding it with bodily sacrifice as a patriotic, even salvific practice.4 
                                                 
4 Diana Taylor has written extensively on the pageantry of Argentina’s Dirty War; see her 
Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’ 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997); for a look into the state pageantry 
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Theatre, in other words, embeds the malevolent power of what Diana Taylor calls the 
‘disappearing act’: the power of performative erasure, through which personal trauma and 
loss may be staged as public gain and violence as an act of grace, of national or cultural 
salvation.5  
 In my work I am particularly interested in a specific facet of this power of 
performative erasure, in which women who have been or are about to become the victims 
of violence – even, and in fact especially, the most seemingly mundane, domestic acts of 
violence – are enlisted to make their suffering disappear (or appear as other than 
suffering), to enact its public cover-up. Their stagings reframe violence against women as 
the reflection (rather than inversion) of a benevolent patriarchy, masking that violence’s 
very source in the latter’s authority and thus protecting it from the threats misogynist 
violence poses to its claims of good governance. These acts of erasure have a long and 
difficult history: any heavily patriarchal culture relies for its perpetuation on the 
containment and subordination of differently sexed and gendered bodies, and thus on the 
performative and discursive elision of the routine violence of subordination that is the 
crucial stuff of its power.6 But the disappearing acts that frame violence against women 
                                                                                                                                                 
of contemporary North Korea, see Suk-Young Kim, ‘Springtime for Kim Il-sung in 
Pyongyang: City On Stage, City As Stage’, TDR, 51:2 (Summer 2007), 24-40.  
5 ‘[D]oesn’t theatre allow us to deny what we see with out own eyes?’ Taylor describes 
this phenomenon as ‘percepticide’: the denial of what one sees that colludes with violent 
power (Disappearing Acts, pp. 125, 123). 
6 The perils of representing violence against women in public space have garnered a good 
deal of recent feminist attention, especially in medieval and early modern studies. Much 
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are not restricted to such cultures, nor are they restricted to a distant past: we see them 
still in the increasingly egalitarian West, in contemporary rape trials where the burden of 
                                                                                                                                                 
work has been done on what Barbara Baines calls the “effacement” of rape in 
Renaissance England, while scholars such as Frances Dolan, Emily Detmer, Margaret 
Hunt and Laura Gowing have explored the representation of domestic violence against 
women through the eighteenth century. See Baines, ‘Effacing Rape in Early Modern 
Representation’, ELH, 65 (1998), 69-98; Dolan, ed., The Taming of the Shrew: Texts and 
Contexts (Boston: Bedford, 1996), pp. 1-38; Detmer, ‘Civilizing Subordination: 
Domestic Violence and The Taming of the Shrew’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 48:3 (1997), 
273-94; Hunt, ‘Wife Beating, Domesticity and Women’s Independence in Eighteenth-
Century London’, Gender and History, 4:1 (1992), 10-33; and Gowing, Domestic 
Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modern London (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996). 
Both Jody Enders and I have explored the specific tangle of rape’s effacement with acts 
of performance; see Enders, ‘The Spectacle of the Scaffolding: Rape and the Violent 
Foundations of Medieval Theatre Studies,’ Theatre Journal, 56 (2004), 163-181, and 
Kim Solga, ‘Rape’s Metatheatrical Return: Rehearsing Sexual Violence Among the Early 
Moderns’, Theatre Journal, 58 (2006), 53-72. For a trans-historical perspective on rape’s 
evasive representations, see Lynn A. Higgins and Brenda R. Silver, eds, Rape and 
Representation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Finally, Diana Taylor’s 
work on the spectacles of elision during the Dirty War in Argentina represents a thorough 
and non-Eurocentric read of the ways in which women’s bodies in violence have been 
bound to the performance of South American machismo. See her Disappearing Acts, in 
particularly ‘Caught in the Spectacle,’ pp. 1-27. 
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proof of non-consent continues to be placed on victims, and in the countless women each 
year who are abused at home and yet perform, on their public stages, the role of devoted, 
loved, and protected wife. For me, two questions emerge from the long history of 
performative disavowal that ghosts women’s bodies in violence. First, when women are 
forced to enact the disappearance of their suffering, how do they accomplish it? And, 
second: when they do, what remains behind, lurking just beyond the edges of the act? 
How should we, as spectators but also as witnesses, respond both to that act and to its 
after-image, the dark shadow of its remainder? Or, to put this conundrum in broader 
terms: how may performance become the tool of violence’s reckoning – specifically, of 
our reckoning with violence against women, and with the disappearing acts that 
characterize its public history – rather than simply the tool of violence’s erasure? 
 Katie Mitchell’s Iphigenia at Aulis, staged at the Royal National Theatre in the 
summer of 2004, offers me an ideal vehicle through which to explore these questions. 
The play embeds a dramaturgical problem: despite Euripides’ trenchant critique of war 
and the mundane barbarities that sustain it, at play’s end he asks that Iphigenia sacrifice 
herself, gloriously and seemingly without prompting, to that very war. Audiences reared 
on psychological realism are, not surprisingly, primed to ask why, to delve into 
Iphigenia’s young mind looking for the clue to her about-face.7 Mitchell, however, is not 
                                                 
7 Several reviewers of Mitchell’s production took some pleasure in looking for this clue. 
Aleks Sierz read in Morahan’s portrayal ‘the teenage passion of a Big Brother fan’ 
looking for martyrdom (Tribune, 25 June 2004); Patrick Marmion saw instead a ‘panting, 
semi-sexual idealism’ in her embrace of sacrifice (Daily Mail, 25 June 2004). John Gross, 
noting the scholarly controversy that has emerged over Iphigenia’s change of heart, 
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at all interested in the promises of discovery made by standard-issue psychological 
realism, and she is not interested in representing the ‘why’ of Iphigenia’s choice. Instead, 
she offers her audiences the ‘how’, in excruciating detail: how Iphigenia enacts the 
erasure of her impending violence, how the spectacle of sacrifice is built and on the burial 
of what precarious, vulnerable bodies it relies. Following Stanislavsky but also departing 
intentionally from the conventions of contemporary British and North American realist 
acting, Mitchell employs a technique I, like Roberta Barker,8 characterize as a form of 
‘radical’ naturalism, a science-based method of physical action that foregrounds the 
visceral experience of affect rather than affect’s mimesis, both for actors and for 
audiences.9 The result is the distressing, disquieting return of the body that rushes, 
                                                                                                                                                 
called Morahan’s performance ‘the embodiment of youth intoxicated by military 
propaganda’ (Sunday Telegraph, 27 June 2004). In each case, reviewers characterize 
Iphigenia’s choice as a childish one, something that allows them to lay blame for her 
actions at the feet of the character’s youth without having to reckon with the larger 
ethical problem Morahan’s performance makes manifest – that of violence’s imbrication 
in the self-conscious theatricality of the moment.  
8 See Roberta Barker’s discussion of Mitchell’s 1992 Royal Shakespeare Company 
production of A Woman Killed With Kindness in her Early Modern Tragedy, Gender, and 
Performance, 1984-2000: The Destined Livery (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2007). 
9 Mitchell has spoken at length in interviews about her working process, which she 
characterizes as a Stanislavskian technique (Gabriella Giannachi and Mary Luckhurst, 
eds., On Directing: Interviews with Directors [London: Faber, 1999],  p. 97) telescoped 
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retches, panics, feels too much, and makes us feel too much in the process – in other 
words, the body banished by conventional acting technique, the body banished by 
violence’s carefully-constructed performative cover-up. As Hattie Morahan forces 
Iphigenia’s uncanny, suffering body up through the gap left by her not-quite-seamless 
performance of sacrifice, the violence produced by theatricalizing that body’s denial – the 
violence of the reality effect itself – becomes the subject of the last portion of Mitchell’s 
production. Watching, listening, and – as I will argue – responding physically to 
Iphigenia’s experience from backstage at the state’s power brokerage, we in the audience 
are privy both to her act of erasure and to the distress of its production. We encounter at 
every turn two bodies: the body sacrifice decrees, the body that gives itself up supposedly 
willingly, but also the living, breathing, frightened, clutching, sweating, sobbing body 
that sacrifice denies, must deny in order to stage-manage the image of patriarchal power 
it is meant to manifest. As Iphigenia prepares to die, she infects the body of authoritarian 
                                                                                                                                                 
through her study and observation of directors such as Anatoly Vasilyev and Lev Dodin 
in Russia, Poland, Lithuania and Georgia in1989. Her process involves lengthy, intensive 
research and textual preparation (Shevtsova, interview with Mitchell, pp. 7-8; Helen 
Manfull, In Other Words: Women Directors Speak [Lyme, NH: Smith and Kraus, 1997], 
pp. 103-4), including research trips undertaken with her design team, as well as plenty of 
work on text and intention with her actors in the rehearsal room. Actors work both 
‘outside in and inside out’, weaving their emotions through specific, repeated physical 
actions in a manner designed to produce particular emotional effects within the audience 
(Shevtsova, interview with Mitchell, pp. 10-11). 
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discourse, the body of performative convention, with the body it discards as both 
meaningless and yet profoundly threatening.10 
                                                 
10 While my focus in this article is narrowed to Iphigenia at Aulis, I want to note that the 
practices of Mitchell’s radical naturalism I explore below are in no way restricted to her 
work on this production. They have become her directorial signature, and I see, in 
particular, extraordinary parallels between their effects in Iphigenia and their effects in 
Mitchell’s acclaimed 1992 staging of Thomas Heywood’s A Woman Killed With 
Kindness at The Other Place, starring Michael Maloney and Saskia Reeves. (I saw 
Mitchell’s A Woman Killed With Kindness on archive video at the Shakespeare Centre 
Library in Stratford-upon-Avon on 11 July 2006.) In Heywood’s play, as in Euripides’, 
the central dramatic conceit is the destruction of a young woman made to appear as 
something entirely less malignant, something more akin to a gift from God or an act of 
grace. Anne Frankford is banished by her husband for the crime of adultery, and yet his 
promise to “kill” her “with kindness” resonates through the play as a covert act of torture 
that refuses to reveal either its punitive roots or its vicious intent. Like Iphigenia, Anne 
embraces her fate: she starves herself to death in penance. But, also like Iphigenia, the 
cost of that embrace threatens both physically and psychically to overwhelm Anne. 
Reeves’ performance, like Morahan’s twelve years later, staged both the body that 
embraced and the body overwhelmed: barely able to speak her praise to her husband and 
her Lord, Reeves’ voice during her climactic deathbed scene was audibly ravaged, 
rasping, her frame barely able to heave itself up into a sitting position. Meanwhile, both 
she and Maloney wept and keened loudly and sloppily in a manner that eerily anticipated 
the later work of Morahan and Duchêne. 
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2. Babel’s voices 
 To get to Iphigenia’s central moment – the moment of violence’s uncanny 
transformation, of the title character’s desperate attempt to stage her own murder sous 
rature – we first need to back up a bit. The centerpiece of Mitchell’s production is in fact 
not Iphigenia at all, who plays a minimal role until her big scene late in the show, but 
rather the chatty, sycophantic chorus of women from Chalcis, clad in black mid-century 
Dior-style dresses, their handbags, compacts, and autograph books at the ready. As 
numerous reviewers noted, these women were fidgety, twittering birds, ‘fussy, twitchy, a 
constant neurotic fluster of grooming and lipstick’.11 They never stopped moving, rarely 
stopped talking – and at several key moments they found themselves trapped in the bright 
glare of lights beamed, surveillance-style, onto the stage from the auditorium space. 
These lights always came up with an unholy, industrial clang that echoed through every 
body in the theatre; pinned by their eye, the women amped up their already anxious, 
manic energy. Splayed against the set’s back wall, stuttering their lines to the 
audience/the lights, they fussed and dropped their handbags, attempted (inevitably failed) 
escape into the wings, and broke into measured foxtrots at the sound of dance music 
piped over the P.A. system. Reviewers’ assessments of the chorus women were decidedly 
mixed. Approximately half found them to be an effective representation of the work’s 
major themes, a strong reminder of how the mundane, in times of war, can become 
                                                 
11 Victoria Segal, Sunday Times (27 June 2004). 
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vicious, discombobulating, threatening.12 Others found that their excessive fidgeting and 
garbled speech marred the performance, distracting audiences with moments of 
misplaced comedy or farce.13 
 The chorus women’s mixed reviews are no surprise to me, for they perfectly 
telescope the larger ethical questions I perceive at the heart of Mitchell’s work in this 
production and elsewhere: What characterizes ‘good’ acting? How is it supposed to make 
us, in the audience, feel? What extra-theatrical purposes does it serve? Does good acting 
provoke a cathartic reaction? If so, who benefits? When is good acting benign, laudable, 
and when is it potentially malignant, a risk to performers and spectators alike? Mitchell’s 
women of Chalcis were, from the moment they entered near the top of the show, a clump 
of awkward bodies press-ganged into an existing set of social and performative 
conventions; the pressure to act properly bore down on them physically and psychically. 
Under that pressure, they relentlessly messed up convention, making us painfully aware 
                                                 
12 See Benedict Nightingale, The Times (24 June 2004), Paul Taylor, The Independent (25 
June 2004), Susannah Clapp, The Observer (27 June 2004), Victoria Segal, Sunday Times 
(27 June 2004), Matt Wolf, International Herald Tribune (7 July 2004), and Rachel 
Haliburton, The Spectator (10 July 2004). All London-based reviews of Mitchell’s 
Iphigenia at Aulis are collected in London Theatre Record for 17-30 June 2004, pp. 821-
27. I have drawn all reviews I reference from this source. 
13 See Patrick Marmion, The Daily Mail (25 June 2004), Nicholas de Jongh, The Evening 
Standard (23 June 2004), Charles Spencer, The Daily Telegraph (24 June 2004), John 
Gross, The Sunday Telegraph (27 June 2004), Michael Billington, The Guardian (23 
June 2004), and John Thaxter, What’s On (30 June 2004).  
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of the scripted lines within which they were unable to keep their bodies. Speaking to 
Maria Shevtsova about the chorus, Mitchell characterized the women’s experience on 
stage as a kind of endless, sinister audition, a decidedly theatrical process of psychic and 
somatic control: 
The performers were given very simple, concrete instructions to achieve the 
effect. They were told that the lights suddenly went on and they saw hundreds of 
men sitting in front of them, leaning back and smoking. The men said nothing, 
they just looked at the women. It frightened the women, who finally came to the 
conclusion that the men were expecting something of them. And, then, dance 
music was suddenly pumped through the PA system in the room where the 
women were and the women felt that they were being instructed to dance. 
However, they had no partners and they were afraid, so they didn’t always dance 
well.14 
Accosted by an audience (one, rather ironically, that sounds remarkably like Brecht’s 
idealized group of contemplative male smokers), the chorus women were constantly 
made aware of the need to produce a particular look and feel, a specific set of reality 
effects; they were constantly reminded that they were on a stage, and that their watchers 
had certain expectations. The ethical circumstances that surrounded their being on that 
stage, however – imminent war, a restless army, their ambivalent, uncertain responses to 
Agamemnon’s cruel trick on his wife and daughter – prevented them from complying 
altogether willingly with performance’s demands. Their conscious attempts to generate 
the expected reality effect (the soothing appearance of the waving crowd; dancing for the 
                                                 
14 Shevtsova, interview with Mitchell, p. 13. 
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good of the war effort) were thwarted at every turn by gut reactions, by their bodies’ 
urges to flight, by the eruption of unconscious anxieties – low-level panic. What the 
chorus women produced was not conventional ‘good’ acting at all, but the failure of that 
convention in the face of the bodily and emotional needs it attempted to over-write. 
Theirs was an urgent compulsion to conform, to ‘act natural’, coupled with a panicky 
need to acknowledge what was being sidelined by the demand that provoked the 
compulsion. Theirs was not proper naturalism, but naturalism performed under the fear of 
– indeed, as a form of – physical and emotional violence. 
 One of the most controversial aspects of the chorus was its engagement with the 
play’s text: Mitchell asked the chorus performers largely to disregard it. As she explains 
in her interview with Shevtsova, she was less interested in the meaning of the chorus’ 
words than in the women’s actions and reactions to the time, place and circumstances in 
which they found themselves: ‘I said: “You have just got to keep talking because there 
are these men sitting there, looking at you, and, if you do not keep talking, they might do 
something really ugly to you.” That, I think, is a hard acting task, particularly in British 
theatre, because here the text is often seen as sacred and it is a risky business not to speak 
it very clearly in a production’.15 Mitchell’s comments (inadvertently?) link the British 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 14. Mitchell’s fears were in part well founded; a number of reviewers 
commented unfavourably on the actors’ ‘blurred voices’ (John Gross, Sunday Telegraph, 
27 June 2004) or her broader liberties with the text (Gross; Carole Woddis, The Herald, 
25 June 2004); Susannah Clapp, The Observer, 27 June 2004). But at least as many 
reviewers understood Mitchell’s intentions and responded accordingly. In the 
International Herald Tribune, Matt Wolf went so far as to invoke the expected 
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theatre establishment’s anxiety over the centrality of the speech act in stage realism (‘the 
text is often seen as sacred’; ‘You have just got to keep talking’) with the possibility of 
real violence beneath the surface of that anxiety and its fraught expectations (‘if you do 
not keep talking, they might do something really ugly to you’).16 Viewed through this 
lens, the men staring down Mitchell’s chorus seem to be much more than just 
representatives of a generic theatrical establishment: they channel the makers of early, 
Ibsenite stage realism, naturalism at its inception, when the principal subject of the realist 
stage was the woman with a past, and when any woman, should she fail to act her 
feminine part properly, might become suspect and fall under difficult scrutiny.17  
                                                                                                                                                 
establishment reaction – ‘Aha! So Euripides wasn’t good enough for Katie Mitchell, you 
are tempted to respond’ – only to challenge it with high praise in his review for The 
International Herald Tribune (7 July 2004).  
16 Earlier in her interview with Shevtsova, Mitchell makes a similar comment: ‘Much 
mainstream theatre here is very preoccupied with words and hearing them spoken clearly. 
There is less interest in representing human behaviour accurately […]. Expressions of 
human behaviour in theatre tend to be either exaggerated or too discreet or made up of 
self-conscious and artificial gestures and sounds. This type of theatre does not interest 
me’ (pp. 8-9). It is, of course, these very ‘self-conscious and artificial gestures and 
sounds’ that the chorus women attempt and fail to make before the glare of the lights. 
17 My comments here and below build on Elin Diamond’s influential work on stage 
realism, psychoanalysis and hysteria in her ‘Realism’s Hysteria: Disruption in the Theater 
of Knowledge’ (in Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on Feminism and Theater [London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997], pp. 3-39). 
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 Early realism understood the stage as a public venue for the talking cure emerging 
from within psychoanalytic discourse at approximately the same time; its money shot was 
the sick or hysterical woman’s all-important confession. For that woman, resolution on 
this stage meant saying the right words, speaking the script on spec, while carefully 
stage-managing her embodied reactions – it meant the all-important performance of her 
body’s truth,18 a reality-effect designed to confirm her audience’s knowledge of and 
power over her. In Studies in Hysteria, Freud shows his readers how completely the 
talking cure relies on a rigidly conformist body aligned with the truth of the spoken word. 
He knows when Elizabeth von R. has not told him the whole truth, because her body 
rebels: her symptoms return. 
As a rule the patient was free from pain when we started work. If, then, by a 
question or by pressure upon her head I called up a memory, a sensation of pain 
would make its first appearance, and this was usually so sharp that the patient 
would give a start and put her hand to the painful spot. The pain that was thus 
aroused would persist so long as she was under the influence of the memory; it 
would reach its climax when she was in the act of telling me the essential and 
decisive part of what she had to communicate, and with the last word of this it 
would disappear. I came in time to use such pains as a compass to guide me; if 
she stopped talking but admitted that she still had a pain, I knew that she had not 
told me everything, and insisted on her continuing her story till the pain had been 
talked away.19  
                                                 
18 Diamond, ‘Realism’s Hysteria’, p. 16. 
19 Quoted in Diamond, ibid. 
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The pain talked away: Freud’s method, however potentially curative, works to erase the 
language, the evidence, of Elizabeth’s body. He reads that language, but only in order to 
eradicate it; finally, her words will speak the truth he desires, making her body’s speech 
redundant (and proving his speech all-powerful). How crucial, and yet finally how 
forgettable, is Elizabeth’s body in Freud’s passage: her pain makes his analysis possible, 
mimes his expectations – and then it simply goes ‘away’.  
 Or does it? Peggy Phelan offers a remarkable reading of the mis-placement of the 
body in Studies in Hysteria,20 and reminds me that before there was a talking cure, there 
was a physical cure, a clinical commitment to somatic experience within the 
psychoanalytic apparatus that precedes Freud’s obsession with the curative potential of 
the ‘right’ language. Rather than placing himself at a physical and emotional distance 
from his patient, the analyst would strive to make an embodied connection with that 
patient, to touch as well as read that patient’s pathology. For Phelan, the talking cure that 
disavows its debt to and inescapable connection with the bodies of its subjects will find it 
cannot compass the flesh it pretends to master with speech;21 her example is Josef 
Breuer’s patient, Anna O. Once her treatment had ended, Anna apparently defied her 
analyst by generating an hysterical pregnancy that implicated him, and specifically his 
                                                 
20 Peggy Phelan, Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 44-72. 
21 Like Phelan, Diamond theorizes a female body that may sign on stage ‘before’ the 
referent, disrupting both naturalism’s and psychoanalysis’ claims to compass the 
complexities of the female subject within their individual truth-telling (truth-making) 
discourses. See ‘Realism’s Hysteria’. 
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sexualized body, in their work together.22 Her body erupted, manic, from within the 
comfortable frame of his analysis, leaving residual traces of his speech on, and in, her 
flesh. 
 This is exactly the eruption, the defiance – of profane body into sacred text; of 
acting body into watching body; of proper, contained speech by the complex psycho-
somatic experiences of brain and flesh – accomplished by Katie Mitchell’s radical 
naturalism. Her performers disrupt the stage frame by producing not too little realism, but 
much too much: not one seamless performance body, readable through the consistent arc 
of its spoken and body languages, but the body psychological realism anticipates 
alongside the bodily affects and experiences it suppresses, discards, deems 
unassimilatable or mimetically unconvincing.23 This is not a Brechtian practice – 
                                                 
22 Phelan, Mourning Sex, pp. 64-7. Phelan notes that aspects of this story may be 
apocryphal. Perhaps truth, perhaps fiction, its resistance to the analyst’s (or the scholar’s) 
certitude only reinforces Phelan’s argument: the analysand’s body may not be so easily 
autopsied by the analyst’s sure speech and exacting gaze.  
23 I realize that my commentary here risks generalizing a generic ‘realism’ based on the 
work of the early naturalists. I do not wish to lump all realisms under this form, but my 
comments also seek to imply a key link between late nineteenth-century naturalism and 
the psychological realist practices that continue to dominate mainstage performance in 
England and North America. We remain surprisingly invested in the kinds of narratives 
(the secret and its discovery; the character with an awkward past) pioneered by the early 
realists, and we continue to give pride of place to the latter as masters of theatrical form 
and as theatrical moneymakers – I think of the regularity with which Ibsen and Chekhov 
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Mitchell’s actors never step out of character; quite the contrary24 – although it holds the 
same disruptive, de-realizing potential as Brecht’s best work does. Rather, following Elin 
Diamond, I would characterize Mitchell’s radical naturalism as a form of realism’s 
hysteria. She materializes her text’s controlling discourses, renders language physical – at 
turns gorgeous and brutal. She pulls words across her performers’ bodies, marks those 
bodies with language’s most violent traces, producing the body of discourse (the body 
discourse anticipates, demands) as a symptom rather than a sign of cure. Pressing 
psychological realism to its limit, Mitchell’s actors rush manically about the stage, twitter 
and trip, worry their props, gasp and sob to the point of retching, as the conforming body 
expected by naturalist mimesis collides with the affective and physical disavowals that 
guarantee that body’s adherence to a rigorously unitary performance ethos. Hers are 
                                                                                                                                                 
are programmed, their popularity in drama schools, and of event stages dedicated to the 
work of the period such as the popular Shaw Festival at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario. 
Meanwhile, some of the most innovative non-realist performance of the last few years 
has picked up on our studious fascination with fin-de-siècle forms. See Kim Solga, 
‘Blasted’s Hysteria: Rape, Realism, and the Thresholds of the Visible’, Modern Drama, 
50:3 (2007), 346-74. 
24 For a Brecht-influenced analysis of some of Mitchell’s earlier work, see Barbara 
Hodgdon, ‘Making it New: Katie Mitchell Refashions Shakespeare-History’, in Marianne 
Novy (ed.), Transforming Shakespeare: Contemporary Women’s Re-Visions in Literature 
and Performance (New York: St Martin’s, 1999), pp. 13-35. Mitchell spoke at length 
with Maria Shevtsova about the tools she provides for her actors to help them stay in 
character throughout a performance, both backstage and onstage (interview, 12). 
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performances that literally haunt: ghosts emerge even as the actors attempt to play their 
characters ‘straight’. 
 
3. Precarious speech 
 When Hattie Morahan’s Iphigenia finally steps up to the microphone under the 
bright, expectant lights that are the chorus women’s plague, ready to put on her show of 
sacrifice, her voice seems to pull free from her tiny, vulnerable frame. It bounces around 
the Lyttleton auditorium once, twice, three times, shuddering me with its reverberant 
echo. Even as Iphigenia prepares at last to speak her father’s language, it is that very 
language (of murder’s performative erasure, of brutal violence acted, naturally, as willing 
sacrifice) that suddenly resonates, haunts, acquires a queer materiality. Her voice, 
amplified by the microphone, is too loud; it is not especially natural. It sounds mediated, 
technologized, imposed; meanwhile, Iphigenia herself oscillates between panicked 
uncertainty and sure-footed delivery, and we hear the sound of both in her strangely 
doubled, tripled, vocal echoes. Katie Mitchell, as I have argued, resists mainstream 
British realism’s preference for properly measured speech over the awkward, excessive 
sounds of aching, unruly bodies in crisis; Iphigenia at Aulis responds by amplifying and 
distorting that measured speech at the moment when its reality effects count the most, the 
moment when theatre is engaged to make over murder. Speaking of the work of Griselda 
Gambaro, Diana Taylor asks: ‘how to stage “blinding” onstage?’25 Mitchell responds: by 
translating the act of blinding into another sensory register, one in which blinding 
becomes perceptible, tangible, as a violent act of representation. Iphigenia’s microphone 
                                                 
25 Taylor, Disappearing Acts, p. 125. 
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– quite despite her own best efforts – mutates the language of violence as gift, as glory, as 
national sacrifice, into precarious speech; in the powerful yet hollow reverb of her voice 
we hear the echo of her body in the process of its going missing. 
 Iphigenia’s sacrificial performance before the microphone begins with the same 
kind of awkward, jumbled jumpiness that characterizes much of the rest of the physical 
movement in this production. Morahan fumbles to turn on the mike while every other 
actor on stage seems wired to explode. She struggles, visibly and audibly, to invent her 
‘heroic’ speech on the fly; she alternately grips and lets go of the microphone’s stand, 
pressing her hands to her face and stammering ‘uh’s into the air. Iphigenia’s fumbling 
gestures embody the ‘willing’ sacrifice as a performative figment, demonstrating the 
extreme pressure violence’s rhetorical disappearance exerts on the body that must disown 
the suffering it feels. In Iphigenia’s panic, her strain to make the speech of a lifetime 
despite her body’s resistance to the script of sacrifice, I see and hear the devastating loss 
– of life, of future, of family – her words work to erase. ‘I dedicate my body as a gift for 
Greece’: each word is carefully intoned, Morahan leaning into the mouthpiece for good 
measure. ‘Take me, sacrifice me, and then to Troy. Plunder the whole city, and when you 
leave it leave a ruin. That will be my memorial’. She steps back, momentarily unable to 
continue; she takes her hands off the microphone stand, which she has been clutching for 
support, and pushes the heels of her palms hard into her eyes. I watch her strain for both 
language and the tongue to speak it; at several moments, she breaks down, gasping and 
crying, even as she channels the voice of the state through her body. She instructs her 
mother not to weep as she claims ‘I am the lucky one’, but these words stick and she is 
overcome. She tries not to cry into the mouthpiece. As she declares her final willingness 
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– ‘this blood of mine will cancel the gods’ decree, and the ships will put to sea’ – she 
gulps the last word, weeps, falls away, then returns to the mike, always conscious to 
ensure that her convulsing head is below its own. Greece must not hear these forbidden 
sounds. 
 Mitchell’s technique in this scene is one of selective amplification: Iphigenia’s 
grand speech resonates through the walls and to the waiting crowd, boosted by the 
microphone’s power, while those in her immediate space (including the auditorium 
audience) also hear and see her bodily grief on a more intimate scale, hear and see it 
collide with the microphone’s grand echo. The contrast is revelatory. Iphigenia’s body 
seems pulled from itself, pulled apart, by language given a dimension of physical force 
from the microphone’s powerful amperage; her words become, literally, a violent and 
violating speech act meant to negate in utero the violating impact of the other, far more 
brutal event on the horizon. Hers is plainly not a heartfelt speech; it is what they want to 
hear, what needs to be said, crafted under what may look for many audience members 
like uncomfortably familiar, oddly ‘real’ extremes of duress. It is also a speech crafted 
visibly for and through the powers that surround and circumscribe this young girl: her 
microphone is their tool, their idol, the thing that is supposed to make the state’s voice 
(the voices of Agamemnon, Menelaus, Odysseus, Achilles) seem remarkable, natural, 
unbreachable. Thus must her body match now the dimensions of its mimetic frame, must 
her small voice, amplified a thousand-fold, mirror and confirm the force of its own. But, 
like the chorus women’s foxtrotting bodies of earlier scenes, neither Iphigenia’s voice nor 
her body can conform seamlessly to the performance convention that ensnares her at this 
moment; backstage, we see through her manic rushing and momentary breakdowns 
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cracks in the image of authority she projects, hear through her heaving sobs, carefully 
hidden from the microphone’s mouthpiece, the trauma masked by words of false comfort. 
 Mitchell’s selective amplification works to produce troubling contrasts between 
Iphigenia’s two bodies – between the suffering body and the state body, the body of 
discipline and discourse and the body in contraband mourning – but it also works to 
generate uncanny collisions between the body Iphigenia struggles to hide and the bodies 
of her spectators, seemingly ensconced at a safe distance from the overwhelming grief on 
stage. These collisions are most powerfully focused in the unexpected, largely accidental 
moments of crossover between the scene’s auditory zones, when Morahan’s stammering 
or crying is briefly picked up by the microphone and the sounds of her pain and 
uncertainty fall over the auditorium in waves, reverberating in each of our watching 
bodies with the visceral force of amplified sound. For a moment, whether we wish it or 
resist it, find it harmless or upsetting, we embody the ghost of Iphigenia’s own grieving, 
the affect Morahan desperately attempts to sign away but which returns to the scene, 
endlessly, as the unshakeable sensation of loss. Iphigenia asks the chorus women to sing 
into the microphone; they offer ‘All Things Bright and Beautiful’. Their weeping mixes 
openly with the melody as both are fed through the amplifier, producing a striking vocal 
dissonance I feel in my gut as much as in my brain, in that way bass-inflected sound has 
of shuddering the abdomen. ‘Theatrical convention allows for splitting of mind from 
body, enabling the audience to respond either emotionally or intellectually to the action it 
sees on stage without responding physically,’ writes Taylor.26 Once more resisting, 
refusing, convention, Mitchell implicates me, my body, and its history in this story, 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
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insisting that a just response to Iphigenia’s experience must be more than cognitive, and 
far from simply binary. 
 
4. Acts of witness 
 The sometimes broken, sometimes doubled voice Mitchell echoes through 
Iphigenia’s microphone is not (or not just) the voice of earlier feminists who have raised 
the radical potential of aurality against the tight strictures governing visual 
representations of the female body. Rather, it is the voice Judith Butler attributes to what 
Emmanuel Levinas calls the ‘face’: word and image confounded, scrambled by one 
another, leaving spectators bereft of the usual tools of performative encounter. In her 
Precarious Life (2004), Butler reads the face not as human, visual icon of profound 
familiarity, but rather as a kind of proto-speech, ‘a scene of agonized vocalization’27 that 
disrupts any claims to the familiar, the sense of the same, we might seek in another’s 
face. Levinas’ face represents the sacrificial script reversed: not flesh made into (W)ord, 
body forced to conform to the shape of a comforting language, but rather word made 
flesh, text interrupted and mutated by the sudden tangibility, undeniability, of embodied 
suffering. The face signs the Christian prohibition against murder – ‘thou shalt not kill’ – 
and yet it may not be assimilated seamlessly into God’s Word (into the words of any 
god) for it speaks in excess of Symbolic language, speaks ‘an agony, an injurability, at 
the same time that it bespeaks a divine prohibition against killing’.28 The face, in other 
words, manifests the power of violence alongside the force of its too-easily-elided 
                                                 
27 Judith Butler, Precarious Life (New York: Verso, 2004), p. 133. 
28 Ibid., p. 135. 
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consequences (agony, injurability), articulating ‘the wordless vocalization of suffering 
that marks the limits of linguistic translation’ in the formula governing violence’s 
performative erasure. ‘The face, if we are to put words to its meaning, will be that for 
which no words really work’, Butler writes; ‘[it] seems to be a kind of sound, the sound 
of language evacuating its sense, the sonorous substratum of vocalization that precedes 
and limits the delivery of any semantic sense’.29 The face, finally, is the sound of human 
suffering in the act of begging a witness, staged in front of (in the face of?) the equally 
ardent and powerful call to translate that suffering into some other kind of sign. It is the 
voice not before language but beneath it, expelled by it, the agonized sounds language 
disavows in order to constitute itself as text, as the mark of civilization. The face is thus 
also, and most importantly, a call to ethics,30 a call for me to witness the limit of my 
power to represent the experience of an other; it provokes instead a different kind of 
encounter, one that challenges the very way in which I come to know that other, and 
know it from myself. 
 At the microphone, Iphigenia becomes this face. When the mike picks up her and 
the other women’s unadorned sounds of agony alongside the sacrificial script of glory 
and salvation (‘My sacrifice brings salvation to the Greeks, and victory’, Iphigenia tells 
the crowd; she rushes away from the mike, frantic, as the chorus women continue to cry 
and sing), we see, hear and feel the sounds that script expels, ‘the sound of language 
evacuating its sense’; it moves us toward a visceral encounter with Iphigenia’s experience 
that the normative regulations governing her violence’s performative erasure cannot 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 134. 
30 Ibid. 
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contain, anticipate, or express. Mitchell’s radical naturalism offers in these uncanny 
sound-images – in their power to enter our bodies, change momentarily our somatic 
response to the performance – much more than realism’s hysterical body-double, come to 
spook the boards of mainstream British theatre. In Iphigenia’s climactic scene I read no 
less than Mitchell’s ethics of spectatorship, her challenge to the ways in which we have 
been schooled to encounter, politely, the embodied stories of our stage. 
 At a roundtable discussion on empathy, activism, and performance at the 2007 
ATHE conference in New Orleans,31 Sonja Arsham Kuftinec argued that we continue to 
understand ‘empathy’ from within a largely enlightenment imaginary characterized by 
clear distinctions between inside and outside; within this framework the objects of our 
empathy will always exist somehow beyond the bounds of citizenship, in a space of 
undifferentiated otherness clearly detached from ourselves. This form of empathy is 
conventionally cathartic; it is a substitute for ethical engagement, one that reaffirms the 
centrality of he or she who experiences suffering from a distance while further 
marginalizing empathy’s recipients, the bodies in true crisis. In place of this bankrupt, 
self-serving version, Kuftinec called for an empathy that might allow audiences to feel 
‘with’ rather than ‘for’ the other, producing an engagement that is simultaneously 
                                                 
31 ‘Regenerating Praxis: Roundtable on Empathy, Activism, and Performance in Times of 
Crisis’ at the ATHE 2007 Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, 26-29 July 2007. This 
panel featured Rhonda Blair, Gay Gibson Cima, John Fletcher, Anne-Liese Juge-Fox, 
Linda Kintz, and Sonja Arsham Kuftinec, and took place on Friday, 27 July in the 
Rhythms ballroom at the Sheraton New Orleans. All quotations from Kuftinec and Kintz 
in this paragraph are taken from my personal notes from the event. 
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affective and intellectual. Linda Kintz responded to Kuftinec’s call with a return to 
Brecht and to the gap or ‘pause’ that motors all his theatre theory: the moment when 
character, performer and spectator are each held in suspension, as individuals, before 
actor ‘becomes’ character and spectator is pulled into the stage world. In that pause, 
Kintz argued, ‘I’ am not yet ‘you’, but I am also not quite myself, the self I am most 
comfortable imagining as myself. We all stand apart from our roles, and I as spectator, if 
only for a moment, stand outside or beside myself, uncertain of my ground. Brecht, of 
course, never sought to banish emotion from the stage; his Verfremdungseffekt is above 
all a process of defamiliarizing the kinds of emotional attachments to which fin-de-siècle 
stage realism had become accustomed. Kintz glosses Brecht for twenty-first century 
performance by suggesting that the power to de-realize emotion in performance need not 
yield only the clichéd, contemplative smoking spectator; it may also generate the 
opposite, a profound spectatorial ‘undoing’. 
 I noted above that Mitchell is no Brechtian, but her performance ethic takes up 
what Kintz characterizes as Brecht’s call to unsettle the watching body, to politicize not 
just realism’s commitment to a certain kind of (contained) affect but also our spectatorial 
attachment to particular brands of stage emotion, as well as our belief in what stage 
emotion is meant to accomplish (and for whom). Mitchell’s actors work not to make us 
feel for them, but to make us feel alongside them, to feel what they are doing: as they 
flutter, babble, never stop moving, I feel my heart rate increase, my stomach turn from 
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the motion sickness.32 Their actions trouble my watching with uncertain, manic feelings 
that I cannot quite locate, but also cannot eradicate: as Iphigenia races between her 
mother, the other women, the mannequin and her microphone, between her self in pain 
and her self in performance, her voice oscillating between blubbering cries and a 
disquieting, disembodied echo, I can also find no place to rest my watching, no place for 
a stable encounter with her experience. I twist and fidget in my seat, cycle through my 
own low-level psychosomatic reactions to the terror she projects. This is not – or not just 
– what we might colloquially call ‘sympathy pains’, or more complexly 
‘neuroempathy’;33 Morahan’s performance compels me to project something of her 
trauma onto my body, but it also prevents me from feeling like myself, from feeling in 
the usual way at a play. It throws the very apparatus of contained, distanced audience 
feeling into disarray.34 This is ‘naturalism’ not as acting convention but as audience 
                                                 
32 ‘All the work on the physicality of emotions was designed so that the emotion targeted 
would occur in the audience. […] The actors were all working to unsettle you, and they 
were primarily doing that physically’ (Shevtsova, interview with Mitchell, 10-11). 
33 Rhonda Blair spoke about empathy’s roots in neuroscience during the ATHE 
roundtable I cite above. She noted that neuroempathy is characterized by a shared mental 
representation between self and other, a mirroring of the body in empathy that represents 
a simultaneously physical and emotional response to another body in crisis. Our 
responses in such situations are not necessarily conscious, and are tied directly to how we 
imagine the other’s pain in relation to our own. 
34 As I trace my own responses to Iphigenia at Aulis I am keenly aware that I cannot 
claim to speak for any other spectator; I offer my entirely subjective reactions to the 
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provocation, a somatic response that generates in turn an ethical choice: as Iphigenia’s 
performance at the microphone grows less and less convincing, it pushes me to move 
beyond traditional viewing modes and toward what Kelly Oliver calls witnessing ‘beyond 
recognition’.35 
 To witness beyond recognition is to understand the experience of the other as both 
profoundly connected to our own, and yet quite beyond the boundaries of our immediate 
                                                                                                                                                 
production not as definitive, but as one possible response alongside what I believe to be 
its profound potential. Moreover, I am aware that the nature of the auditorium in which 
this production was staged no doubt had an important effect on how Mitchell’s actors’ 
work might have been received by a gamut of spectators. While one could easily argue 
that the grand and formal qualities of the National Theatre’s Lyttleton auditorium would 
detract from the intimate suffering on stage, encouraging distanced watching despite the 
manic fluster of the characters, I suspect the opposite. The voice emanating from 
Iphigenia’s microphone, for example, resonated with particular power around such a 
huge space, and the sonorous clangs of the various machinery employed during the 
production – to, for example, slam doors shut or bring the safety curtain down – were 
made literally palpable as a result of their own vast echoes against the high walls. If 
anything, I found the collision of the large, formal, proscenium space and Iphigenia’s 
troubled embodiment to add to, rather than to limit, the disorienting effects Mitchell 
sought to produce. My thanks to Caridad Svich for prompting me to think more about the 
Lyttleton space itself in relation to my argument. 
35 Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2001).  
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understanding. The witness beyond recognition is not an eyewitness; rather, he or she 
distrusts the evidence of sight and looks for other ways, other sensory, affective, and 
intellectual avenues, to bear witness to what is not immediately visible or recognizable, to 
what lies, as Diana Taylor might say, beyond the act of blinding, the disappearing act. 
When we spectate, Roger Simon argues, we engage actively with what we see and hear, 
but we also work, just as actively, to manage our experience of the other’s story at a safe 
distance from ourselves (what Kuftinec might call an enlightenment practice of empathy). 
Simon points out that there is nothing wrong with this form of spectatorship; it is an 
essential human practice that makes most intersubjective encounter possible. But he also 
notes that spectatorship alone can never produce a genuinely ethical encounter, an 
encounter with the other as other that is the province of the witness, because it refuses to 
place the spectator him or herself in a position of emotional or epistemological 
vulnerability, of ‘undoing’. For Simon, as for Linda Kintz, witness is both an act of 
embodiment and an act of dis-embodiment: as a witness I become implicated in the story 
of the other, become ‘obligated’ by his or her testimony,36 while also allowing myself to 
become profoundly disturbed, disarticulated, by the foreign contours of that story. 
Witnessing makes us question who we are, what we think we know, and how we know it; 
it ‘is neither a metaphor for simply being emotionally moved by another’s story nor a 
traumatic repetition’, but ‘signals a recognition of an encounter with difficult knowledge 
                                                 
36 Roger Simon, The Touch of the Past: Remembrance, Learning, and Ethics (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p. 92. 
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[…] that which brings me more than I can contain’.37 The witness to trauma, as Dori 
Laub puts it, must also be prepared to be ‘a witness to himself [sic]’.38 
 How does Katie Mitchell, finally, show us to ourselves, demand a 
reconfiguration of our knowledge of this girl Iphigenia, her violence, its loss? Her 
speeches over (her time run out), Iphigenia is hauled bodily offstage. ‘Not one tear, 
mother!’ Morahan shouts, frantic, as she is pulled away; left behind, Clytemnestra 
crumbles, shrieking and sobbing, to the floor as the door clangs shut. That clang is louder 
than life; like so much else here it has an uncanny voice, and as that voice booms through 
the auditorium it makes once more manifest the haunting, echoing sounds of loss that 
have littered the preceding scene. Then, the door comes down; loud, loud machine noises 
fill the entire space. The ceiling rains in; the chorus women run away. Iphigenia is 
murdered – and the house goes, literally, to pieces. 
 An old man enters to tell Clytemnestra of Iphigenia’s miracle transformation on 
the altar, but by now the damage is done. The soothing promise of salvation for mother, 
daughter, and for Greece he brings (and which Achilles echoes, as he tells Clytemnestra 
to ‘put away’ her grief and anger against her husband) cannot erase the physical force 
with which Mitchell has performed Iphigenia’s final erasure, translated it not into signs, 
into text, but into a kind of architectural destruction, an almost earthquake-like 
Armageddon. We do not see either the violence of sacrifice or sacrifice’s supposed 
conversion into the body/text of myth; instead, we hear in our assaulted ears and feel in 
our jolted frames the resonance of suffering and terror that cannot simply be talked away, 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 10. 
38 Quoted in Taylor, Disappearing Acts, p. 27. 
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easily turned to comfort, even as the old messenger attempts once more, futilely, to do 
just that. For Roger Simon, the ‘touch of the past’ that moves the witness is world-
shaking in this very way; it is a remembrance that is ‘always incomplete’,39 a story for 
which we don’t quite have a proof, impelling us ‘into a confrontation and reckoning not 
only with stories of the past but also with ourselves as we are (historically, existentially, 
socially) in the present’.40 To act as Iphigenia’s witness is to ask the question: how does 
what I have just seen, or what I have just failed to see, change the way I will look from 
now on? Will I remember Iphigenia as the echo of an old man’s fond language? As the 
echo of her own choking narrative of sacrifice? Or will I remember her by the force of 
her ravaged sounds echoing through my body, by the shock of the blasts that shook my 
seat, brought a building down? In whose reality effects – in whose ‘reality’ – will I invest 
my faith, and why? 
 This is what performance, at its best, can do for the women who are the victims of 
its disappearing acts. It can stage the call to witness that ghosts all spectatorship, and 
demand of an audience these crucial choices: how will I choose to see and hear? What 
risks, what encounters with body, with affect, will I permit myself, and from what will I 
turn away? How will I let this scene change me, change what I expect from the theatre? 
This kind of performance – call it a feminist performance of violence – does not ask how 
it might make the experience of violence’s loss seem real on stage. Rather, it asks 
Taylor’s question: how stage a blinding? When a woman’s body in violence, suffering, 
panic and fear promises to go so spectacularly missing – as does Iphigenia’s here – this 
                                                 
39 Simon, The Touch of the Past, p. 101. 
40 Ibid., p. 135. 
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rebel transformation returns not just that body but the chilling echo of its absence to the 
scene of representation, and asks us to engage with the sounds, the sensations, of loss. 
